THE MILITARY-JUDICIAL NEXUS IN RESPONSE TO TERRORISM:
THE KKK AND ALQAEDA
Wayne McCormack1
Imagine, if you will, this scenario in a third-world dictatorship. The President has announced that an
alleged offender can be turned over to military authorities and prosecuted before a military commission
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rather than civilian court. One citizen is arrested in his own country by his own government and held
incommunicado for 30 days, then turned over to military authorities, and imprisoned indefinitely with no
hearing and no public disclosure of the evidence against him, not even to a court sitting in habeas
corpus.3 The military then decides not to conduct a trial at all for those that it determines to be “enemy
combatants” and simply holds these persons in custody with no contact with the outside world and no
prospects of judicial proceedings.4
Meanwhile, hundreds of persons of diverse nationalities are captured in armed conflict with another
nation, and transported to an island military base not on the national soil of the capturing nation, where
they are held as combatants of the capturing nation but not as prisoners of war.5 The nation in which they
were captured is an enemy in an undeclared war because the nation was accused of harboring criminals
who acted against the capturing nation.6 International human rights organizations criticize the capturing
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nation for holding prisoners in violation of international conventions.
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This is not the plot of a cheap movie about third-world dictatorships. Each of these actions is part of
the United States’ “War on Terrorism.” Wending their way to the Supreme Court are three cases
presenting the range of possibilities for detention without trial: one US citizen arrested on US soil for
allegedly plotting violent action against civilian targets on US soil, one US citizen captured in a country
in which US forces were engaged in armed conflict, and one non-citizen arrested on US soil for alleged
participation in violence against civilians on US soil.
The scholars, as well as the political pundits, are split on the issue of the validity of using military
commissions in this context. Professor Paust, a former faculty member of the Army JAG School, takes
the position that the President’s Commander in Chief power to set up military commissions applies only
during actual war within a war zone or relevant occupied territory and apparently ends when peace is
finalized.8 Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, however, argue that President Bush had statutory authority
to issue the Order, and probably also had independent constitutional authority to do so as Commander in
Chief.9
With utmost humility, there are at least three more conclusions that suggest themselves.
First, the thought of indefinite military detention of a US citizen arrested on US soil for a domestic
crime is far beyond the pale of basic constitutional underpinnings. There is no justification in AngloAmerican history for indefinite detention without trial. With respect to noncitizens and citizens captured
overseas, the President’s power is arguable but far from solid. In that event, why not take the route that
does the least disruption to our system? If the bad guys can make us change and appear to panic, then
aren’t they already accomplishing some of their goals? Isn’t it more in keeping with our societal attitudes
toward terrorism to refuse them the honor of being considered an entity worthy of belligerent status as
opposed to just ordinary criminals?
Second, because the law abhors incoherence, we should be able to make coherent distinctions among
alleged terrorists for the purpose of deciding who is tried in civilian courts, who is tried in military
tribunals, and who if anyone is detained indefinitely with no trial at all. US military commissions are
available only to prosecute violations of the “law of war,”10 so it becomes important to distinguish those
thinks that the legal status of each internee needs to be clarified on an individual basis and has repeatedly urged the
US to do this. In any case, the US has the right to legally prosecute any internee at Guantanamo Bay suspected of
having committed war crimes or any other criminal offence punishable under US law prior to or during the
hostilities.” http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/D218FD3E4617732A41256C760044F5F6
Amnesty International has openly complained that the US is violating international law in its detention and
treatment of detainees at Guantanamo. See
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violations from the actions of ordinary criminals. This is important to American law, not to denigrate
military tribunals but to validate the basic assumptions of American civil justice and to lend coherence to
an otherwise incoherent set of choices. The history of federalism and terrorism in the United States under
the post-Civil War statutes can be helpful in defining offenses that have multi-sovereign implications.
Third, indefinite detention of “combatants” in an offshore prison camp is highly doubtful, although
apparently beyond the reach of US courts, and subject to diplomatic negotiations. Under the Geneva
Conventions, even persons who “have fallen into the hands of the enemy” as to whom there is any
“doubt” about their POW status are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war “until such time as their
status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”11 Thus, some form of review of the status of these
persons should be a feature of US diplomatic relations with other nations.
I. Setting the Stage
There are at least four “fronts” on which the US government has made aggressive moves against
individuals thought to represent a threat to American public safety, and this article deals with only one of
those. Three topics to be excluded are: (1) issues of the propriety of invading countries such as
Afghanistan and Iraq, (2) the expansion of investigatory powers of federal law enforcement, through the
USA Patriot Act, with many tools that will inevitably trigger Fourth Amendment challenges,12 and (3)
immigration reforms that include powers to track and detain alleged violators.13
Although it links into the others to some degree, I want to focus here on at least some aspects of a
partial change from criminal processes to military action in dealing with some alleged terrorists.
Thus, let me be specific about what is within the scope of this article and what is not. No civilian has
yet been charged before a military tribunal. Yaser Hamdi is a US citizen held in military custody after
capture on foreign soil as an “enemy combatant,” a term that arose from use of military commissions, so
we will need to deal with the power of the military to detain. Anyone captured within the “theater of
operations” of a legitimate military action is subject to military law, including detention and trial for
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crimes against the “law of nations,” but that is a far cry from indefinite detention without trial and it
assumes a definition of treason as being part of the “law of nations.”
Second, Jose Padilla is being held in military custody following arrest on US soil for conspiracy to
commit an act of violence against civilian targets within the US. Military detention of a citizen captured
within US borders would depend upon either a valid declaration of martial law pursuant to emergency or
a judicial finding of “enemy combatant” status by linkage with a foreign power.
Third, there are a number of alleged terrorist cells whose noncitizen members are awaiting trial in US
civilian courts. With regard to trial processes for alleged terrorists operating within this country, the first
question is why are they being treated differently from Padilla? The use of military commissions, for
either citizen or noncitizen, turns on whether the allegations involve violations of the “law of war,” which
should turn on whether the perpetrator has acted “under color of state authority.” The terrorist operating
without sanction of any nation-state is merely a criminal, not a violator of the law of war because the laws
of war operate among nations.14
Finally, with regard to noncitizen detainees captured abroad (the Guantanamo detainees), there is
surprisingly little to say: the principal focal points are international law, the President’s emergency
powers, and the simple question of what to do with some people who placed themselves in an undesirable
situation.15 We need to consider their situation, however, to round out the picture of the legal regime that
applies to the multi-front task of confronting terrorism.
II. Military Commissions and the Classification of “Enemy Combatant”
The US administration argues that military commissions can be convened pursuant to the President’s
C-in-C powers as augmented by statutory authorization for the use of military commissions when
warranted by the law of war.16 The argument is that members of a well-organized international terrorist
group engaged in violent attack on the US qualify as enemy combatants under international law. The
counter-argument is that the customs and usages of international law permit military commissions to
operate only in the actual “theater of operations” of the military or in occupied territory. We will get to
the details of these arguments later after developing much of the background and implications of using
military commissions.
With regard to those who carry out illegal activities within this country on behalf of a foreign state,
the Supreme Court was willing to allow the military to deal with them outside the setting of the normal
criminal processes during World War II.17 That incident, however, is “bookended” by the Civil War cases
14
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insisting that military courts cannot operate in areas where the civilian courts are open and operating18
and by the invalidity of using military tribunals in Hawaii during World War II.19
A great deal of speculation has been devoted to the issue of whether military commissions can be
assembled for AlQaeda members. Interestingly, however, not a single commission has yet been
empaneled for prosecution of a terrorist offense. I am choosing to add to the speculation here because the
subject casts considerable light on the remainder of our issues.
A. The Civil War and WWII Precedents
The leading case is Ex parte Quirin,20 in which eight persons were arrested early in World War II by
the FBI and handed over to military authorities for trial as spies or saboteurs. They had landed in two
groups of four by German submarine, one group on Long Island with targets in New York City and the
other group near Jacksonville, Florida with a variety of targets. Each had undergone training in Germany,
was paid by German officials, was issued a German military uniform to wear until ashore in the US, was
arrested in civilian clothing, and brought a quantity of explosives ashore. With a bit of procedural
maneuvering regarding whether captured spies could even have recourse to the civilian courts for a writ
of habeas corpus, which the Supreme Court did not hesitate to answer affirmatively, the Court held that
they were not entitled to the processes of civil courts but could be dealt with under military law for
violations of the “law of war.”
The Constitution has three statements regarding the place and type of trial for offenses against the
United States, with one key exception for cases “arising in the land and naval forces, or in the Militia, in
actual service in time of War or public danger.”21 For substantive rules of criminal behavior, Article I, 8
grants Congress the power, in addition to the familiar power to make rules and regulations for governance
of the military, “To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses
against the Law of Nations.”
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Article III, 2:
The trial of all Crimes except in cases of Impeachment shall be by Jury and such Trial shall be held in
the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed but when not committed within any State, the
Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
The Fifth Amendment:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger . . .
The Sixth Amendment:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and notice of charges, confrontation of witnesses, subpoena
power, and right to counsel.
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Taking all these provisions together, it is easy to construct an argument that it is up to Congress to
define and criminalize offenses such as sabotage and war crimes, that the place of trial shall be where the
offense was committed or such other place as directed by law, that the accused is entitled to trial by jury
and the other rights of the sixth amendment, and that none of this contemplates anything other than the
normal processes of the civilian courts except in cases “arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.”22 The exception is so clearly targeted to
offenses committed by US personnel that it is difficult to imagine its application to foreign nationals
either one way or the other.
These provisions are all so consistent with each other and with the argument for civilian courts that it
is difficult to construct the counter argument. The Supreme Court in Quirin relied upon a minimal amount
of textual analysis to point out that the Article III and fifth amendment provisions must be read in light of
their historical understanding, which was that not all offenses give rise to a right of trial by jury. The two
examples used for this purpose S petty offenses and criminal contempt charges S did not give rise to a
jury trial but did remain in the civilian court systems.23 The Quirin opinion also relied on a structural
anomaly if our own troops are subject to military tribunals, why should the alleged bad guys get better
treatment by being sent to the civilian system?
Most of the opinion was historical, citing examples from the Revolutionary War and Civil War of
alleged spies who were subjected to the death penalty either by commanding officer fiat or after the
current version of a military proceeding. Of interest to the current situation, the Court stated in no
uncertain terms that the offenders were outside the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, not because
they were aliens24 but because they had violated the law of war by committing offenses traditionally
triable by military tribunal.25
This approach makes the jurisdiction of military tribunals depend on the nature of the charged offense
S violation of the law of war. In the case of members of terrorist groups, what law of war has been
violated? Quirin was decided in the unquestioned context of war, a more or less easily understood term
22
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and requiring a separate trial for contempt that does not threaten the continuation of the proceedings. Frank v.
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recognized that there is a class of unlawful belligerents not entitled to that privilege, including those who,
though combatants, do not wear “fixed and distinctive emblems.” And by [the predecessor of 10 U.S.C.
§815], Congress has made provision for their trial and punishment by military commission, according to
the “law of war.”
317 U.S. at 35.
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referring to conditions of hostilities between nation states. Since WWII, the international community has
been defining crimes of international law that do not depend on conditions of hostility between nations.
But are those offenses triable under US law in military courts or in the civilian courts? In fact, the
international community has been quite adamant in not defining the acts of terrorists to be acts of war,
lawful or unlawful.
The argument for using civilian courts rather than military courts under US domestic law hinges on
Ex parte Milligan.26 Milligan was arrested in Indiana during the Civil War, charged with conspiracy
before a military commission, convicted and sentenced to death by hanging. His habeas corpus petition
was granted by the Supreme Court unanimously, although the nine Justices disagreed over whether the
defects in the proceedings were constitutional or statutory. Justice Davis, for the five-vote majority, held
that Congress could not authorize the use of military commissions even for violations of the “laws and
usages of war” in areas outside the “theater of operations” and in which the civilian courts were open and
operating.27 Chief Justice Chase, for the four-vote minority, believed that Congress could have authorized
28
the use of military commissions under these circumstances but had not done so.
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It can serve no useful purpose to inquire what those laws and usages [of war] are, whence they originated,
where found, and on whom they operate; they can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld
the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed. This court
has judicial knowledge that in Indiana the Federal authority was always unopposed, and its courts always
open to hear criminal accusations and redress grievances; and no usage of war could sanction a military
trial there for any offence whatever of a citizen in civil life, in nowise connected with the military service.
Congress could grant no such power; and to the honor of our national legislature be it said, it has never
been provoked by the state of the country even to attempt its exercise. One of the plainest constitutional
provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not ordained and established by
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71 U.S. at 121-22.
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The fact that the Federal courts were open was regarded by Congress as a sufficient reason for not exercising
the power; but that fact could not deprive Congress of the right to exercise it. Those courts might be open
and undisturbed in the execution of their functions, and yet wholly incompetent to avert threatened danger,
or to punish, with adequate promptitude and certainty, the guilty conspirators.
...
It was for Congress to determine the question of expediency. And Congress did determine it. That
body did not see fit to authorize trials by military commission in Indiana, but by the strongest implication
prohibited them.
71 U.S. at 141-42.
Chief Justice Chase went further to deliver a lecture about the role of President Lincoln and the military officers
in these matters:
With that prohibition [by Congress] we are satisfied, and should have remained silent if the answers to the
questions certified had been put on that ground, without denial of the existence of a power which we
believe to be constitutional and important to the public safety, S a denial which, as we have already
suggested, seems to draw in question the power of Congress to protect from prosecution the members of
military commissions who acted in obedience to their superior officers, and whose action, whether
warranted by law or not, was approved by that up-right and patriotic President under whose administration
7

Milligan is often read as stating emphatically that it would be unconstitutional to prosecute citizens in
military commissions for crimes committed in areas in which the civilian courts are open and operating.
There is even stronger language in Beckwith v. Bean29 a civil case for false imprisonment under similar
facts as Milligan but decided long after the Civil War was over. In Beckwith, Justice Field delivered a
vigorous lecture about the inability of Congress to suspend the operation of civilian law even in war
30
time.
The Supreme Court in Quirin answered the Milligan argument rather curtly by pointing out that
“Milligan, not being a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent, not
subject to the law of war save as S in circumstances found not there to be present, and not involved here S
martial law might be constitutionally established.”31 In this statement, the Quirin Court observed that
Congress had not established “martial law” in the US, but the opinion relies extensively on explaining
that these saboteurs had penetrated behind military lines to reach targets that were potentially civilian
support systems for the military’s war effort.
The implication of these observations is that the “theater of operations,” in which military
commissions could act, was expanded to reach those areas behind friendly lines in which saboteurs would
find it profitable to operate. From this, one could conclude that the “theater of operations” in time of
armed conflict extends to any target that a saboteur desires to strike, and from this the act of a terrorist
becomes the act of an “enemy combatant.”
But can the President, even with the consent of Congress, authorize military detention or trial of a US
citizen when the civilian courts are open and operating? Quirin points in the direction of yes, at least
when the US is in the middle of a declared war and the alleged perpetrators are captured in the middle of
attacking US targets. Milligan says emphatically no, unless the context of national emergency is so great
that there is military necessity for supplanting the civilian processes.
There is further guidance to be gained from Duncan v. Kahanamoku,32 which struck down the use of
military tribunals during a time of “martial law” in Hawaii following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Duncan
was a “civilian shipfitter employed in the Navy Yard at Honolulu” who “engaged in a brawl with two
armed Marine sentries at the yard.” The military authorities (presumably foregoing a charge of criminal
stupidity) charged him with violation of a standing military order, “assault on military or naval personnel
with intent to resist or hinder them in the discharge of their duty.” At the time, Hawaii was under martial
law, although the civilian courts were open and operating for some purposes. Duncan was convicted and

the Republic was rescued from threatened destruction.
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No mere order or proclamation of the President for the arrest and imprisonment of a person not in the military
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unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction, can constitute the due process of law, nor can it be made such by
any act of Congress.
98 U.S. at 293.
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sentenced by a military tribunal, and the Supreme Court invalidated his conviction. While recognizing
that Congress had authorized the declaration of martial law in the Hawaii Organic Act, the Court
reviewed the history of military tribunals as it existed at the time of the Organic Act and concluded that it
“was not intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals.”33
By relying on congressional intent, the Court in Duncan avoided constitutional grounds for its
decision, but it was clear that the situation skirted on constitutional issues. Citing Milligan, the Court
stated,
We have always been especially concerned about the potential evils of summary criminal
trials and have guarded against them by provisions embedded in the Constitution itself.
Legislatures and courts are not merely cherished American institutions; they are indispensable to
our Government.
Military tribunals have no such standing.34
Indeed, in something approaching a fit of pique, Justice Black’s opinion referred to the Civil War
experience by pointing out that “in order to prevent this Court from passing on the constitutionality of
[Reconstruction] legislation Congress found it necessary to curtail our appellate jurisdiction.”
The Duncan Court was well aware of Quirin, decided just four years earlier, as well as In re
Yamashita, decided [same day? week?] as Duncan. What the Court said to distinguish these cases, as well
as others involving legitimate use of military tribunals was this:
Our question does not involve the well-established power of the military to exercise
jurisdiction over members of the armed forces, those directly connected with such forces, or
enemy belligerents, prisoners of war, or others charged with violating the laws of war. We are not
concerned with the recognized power of the military to try civilians in tribunals established as a
part of a temporary military government over occupied enemy territory or territory regained from
an enemy where civilian government cannot and does not function. . . . Nor need we here
consider the power of the military simply to arrest and detain civilians interfering with a
necessary military function at a time of turbulence and danger from insurrection or war.
In short, the Court limited the legitimate realm of military tribunals to governance of the armed forces
themselves, the “theater of operations” (including occupied territory, as Winthrop argued) and “others
charged with violating the laws of war.” So once again we come to the question of whether a person
acting without “color of state action” can violate the law of war.
B. Non-State Actors and the “Law of War”
The Government claims statutory authority in support of the Commander-in-Chief powers from 10
U.S.C. §821 (Article 15 of the UCMJ), which states that creation of military courts-martial by statute
does not “deprive military commissions . . . of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or
offenses that . . . by the law of war may be tried by military commissions.” The argument from Quirin
goes on to assert that in wartime conditions, military necessity as determined by the Commander-in-Chief
can justify using military tribunals for punishment of offenses against the law of war. Because a terrorist
act (wearing civilian clothing, targeting a civilian facility, and blending back into a civilian population) is
against the law of war, even in the absence of an international definition of “terrorism,” then the power of
the military is complete.35
33
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The Quirin opinion distinguished Milligan on the ground that “Milligan, not being a part of or
associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent.” Professors Bradley and Goldsmith
argue that AlQaeda is a sufficiently organized and hostile organization to be subject to the law of war. “If
the September 11 attacks were committed by traditional state actors during this armed conflict, they
would clearly violate international law prohibitions on attacking civilian populations and destroying their
property.”36 They argue that “there is precedent for applying the laws of war to groups not directly acting
on behalf of nation-states, such as guerilla groups and insurgents.”
Guerrillas and insurgents, however, do not violate the law of war by the inherent nature of their
mission or composition. They may violate provisions against systematically attacking populations and
engaging in armed conflict without appropriate insignia. For specific violations of this type, the guerilla
may be criminally responsible, but it is also possible to conduct guerilla operations in compliance with the
law of war. For example, the lack of insignia may be justified by defense of home so long as they limit
targets to military ones. Thus, this argument in favor of allowing military commissions to try offenses
committed by terrorists boils down to equating the terrorist operation to an ongoing state of armed
conflict with a “belligerent” who violates the law of war, or as often designated in government policy
statements, an “illegal enemy combatant.” But a belligerent is not illegal just by being a belligerent.
Professor Paust argues not just from Milligan but also from general international law as represented
by noted scholars37 that the authority of military commissions is limited to the “theatre of operations” or
occupied territory. Moreover, he points out that granting the status of “insurgent” or “belligerent” to
AlQaeda would have the unintended, and potentially disastrous, effect of giving them the option of
practicing their terrorist acts in legitimate ways.38 All they would have to do is don an appropriate
insignia, limit their attacks to militarily defined targets, and they do not commit any crime against the law
of war. Of course, anyone wearing such an insignia could be hunted down and killed without warning, but
they could not be prosecuted for war crimes.
There are two interesting aspects of this argument. One is that there is another way of looking at
Quirin and Milligan, which focuses more on the role of Congress and “martial law” in keeping with the
concurrence of Chief Justice Chase in Milligan. The other interesting issue has to do with the
terminology. We will consider them in reverse order.
There has been a great deal of sloppiness in the popular press, and even in some legal writing, around
the terms “insurgent,” “belligerent,” and “combatant.” A quick explanation of these terms will help
explain why the language of war just does not fit the actions of or reactions to an organized terrorist
group. Most of these terms have been designed for use in determining when it is appropriate for an
outside nation to come to the aid of a group fighting with its own recognized government. Until now, it
has not been necessary to have special terminology for the member of an enemy military.
The terms “rebel” and “rebellion” refer to persons or groups who are violently opposed to the existing
regime within their own country. It is not legitimate for another nation to come to the aid of a rebellious
force. For this purpose, rebellion “covers minor instances of internal war of a wide variety: violent protest
involving a single issue . . . or an uprising that is so rapidly suppressed as to warrant no acknowledgment
36
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of its existence on an international level.”39 The second stage of internal conflict is “insurgency,” which is
somewhere between rebellion and belligerency. The declaration of an activity as insurgency basically
protects other nations and their nationals from being accused of aiding a criminal faction if they have any
contact with the insurgents, such as by doing business in nonmilitary goods. Only when a group achieves
the status of “belligerent” can other nations come to their aid. A belligerent is characterized by the ability
to control a segment of territory and thus require other nations either to choose sides in the conflict or to
declare neutrality between them.
Because the terms “insurgent” and “belligerent” were developed for use in sorting out the rights and
obligations of other nations with respect to an internal dispute in one nation, they are not suited for use in
instances of open armed conflict between nations. For that purpose, international law has turned to the
concepts of “combatant” and “noncombatant,” along with occasional use of terms such as “camp
follower” and “retainer.” Combatants are expected to be in uniform or otherwise recognizably identified.
Noncombatants need not carry any special insignia but certain facilities such as hospitals and schools are
entitled to even greater protection when they are clearly identified, as are the medical and religious
personnel who wear special symbols so long as they refrain from any military act.
The US governmental positions of the past year have attempted to brand everyone connected with
AlQaeda an “unlawful enemy combatant.” The potency of this term, if successful, would be enormous. It
is the same as branding someone a spy or war criminal. This term places the accused squarely within the
operation of military law.40 It further triggers application of the law of war and all its defined criminal
behavior, such as targeting civilian populations.
With the terminology more firmly in mind, let us return to the question of using military commissions
in civilian territory during wartime. The concurring opinion in Milligan is sometimes dubbed a dissent
because Chase disagreed vigorously with the constitutional analyis of the majority. The majority had said
that Congress could not authorize military commissions and the suspension of habeas corpus in areas that
were out of the theater of operations and in which the civilian courts were open and operating. Chase, on
the other hand, argued that Congress could have done so but had affirmatively chosen not to allow those
actions during the Civil War. The Government now argues that Quirin chose the Chase formulation and
that Congress has provided the necessary authorization.
Chase’s opinion, however, deals with declaration of “martial law” not just with the use of military
commissions when martial law has not been declared. In the absence of application of military law
generally to a region, then there is no place for the use of military commissions absent military action of
the type portrayed in Quirin. Colonel Morgan makes this point vigorously and even Colonel-Professor
Winthrop may be read as having the concept of martial law in mind as a precursor to exercise of the
power claimed for Congress. Certainly, even Winthrop would agree that Congress would have to declare
a national emergency or be unable to act.
As a matter of pure logic, Professor Paust must have the better of the argument. that the use of
military commissions is limited to the theater of operations. The government’s argument that the
President can apply military law and procedures to anyone who engages in “armed attack” upon the
United States would have no limits. Anyone who attacks a US governmental, military, or even civilian
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target could be branded an enemy combatant under this view of plenary military authority.
C. Application of US Law to Alleged Terrorists
Having cast at least some doubt on the “jurisdiction” of military tribunals, we should explore the
question of what law applies. Because picking the tribunal depends in part on what law applies, we need
to know the sources of law that can be applied to terrorists.
Some of the Guantanamo detainees may have been members of AlQaeda or related terrorist
organizations. Some may have been more or less directly implicated in specific terrorist actions. Because
the language of war was used from the beginning with respect to these detainees, a widespread perception
has been created that the alleged terrorist is to be dealt with in military fashion. There may even be a
perception in existence that there is no criminal law to deal with the alleged wrongs of some of these
people. In fact, there is a substantial body of law that applies to both citizen and noncitizen alike, to
offenses committed on US soil and to those committed abroad. So before we turn to the military
commission, it would be profitable first to outline the law that could be applied to an alleged terrorist in
the civilian courts.
1. Citizen-Noncitizen Distinctions
For some reason, the Bush administration chose to draw a distinction between citizens and
noncitizens in the Military Order authorizing the trial of AlQaeda members by military commissions.41
The same distinction also has been drawn as a practical matter in dealing with the detainees because the
only two known US citizens originally confined in Cuba were transferred to Virginia, one to be tried in
the civilian courts42 and one to be detained in military isolation.43
Citizenship does matter in this context in one important regard. The citizen has a constitutionally
protected right to enter the United States at any time,44 whereas the noncitizen has rights of entry only so
far as granted by Congress.45 It may have been a violation of citizenship rights to have continued
confinement of citizens in Cuba, whereas the noncitizens have no more right to be brought to the United
States than to be taken anywhere else. Their confinement is purely a matter of international law except to
the extent that there is a question of Presidential emergency power to hold people in confinement to begin
with. When we look at that question below, there may well be a distinction to be drawn between citizens
and noncitizens on that issue as well.
Oddly, the citizen-noncitizen distinction has worked the reverse with regard to persons arrested on US
soil. Padilla, a citizen, was sent to military custody46 while a number of noncitizens arrested on charges of
41
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supporting terrorist activity are pending trial in civilian courts.47 Again, the citizen-noncitizen distinction
has no function in the context of which court system will take jurisdiction over the offender, and we are
met with another example of incoherence in government responses to the terrorism phenomenon.
2. Acts Committed Outside US Territory
It might be thought that there would be a difference between criminal acts committed on US soil and
those committed abroad. This distinction is material only in a very limited class of cases. The US, like
most nations, claims extra-territorial jurisdiction to apply its law and procedures in roughly five classes of
cases:48
1.
external incidents with effects in US territory
2.
a victim that is a US national
3.
a perpetrator that is a US national
4.
impacts on interests of the US
5.
“universal” jurisdiction
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Unfortunately, the categories are spelled out this cleanly neither in US statutes nor even in the
Restatement of Foreign Relations.49 The statute defining “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction” of
the US,50 contains a long list of provisions that have accumulated over the years and includes several
examples of the first four categories by referring to crimes committed by or against US nationals under
certain circumstances, by detailing offenses committed on the high seas on or against certain vehicles, and
by referring to categories of US possessions. In some instances, the statute limits application of US law in
extraterritorial settings “to the extent permitted by international law.” This is a reference to an inherent
limitation that no application of one nation’s law is to interfere with the sovereignty of another nation.51
52
The federal statute detailing “acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries” likewise relies on
several aspects of US interests, such as “ interstate or foreign commerce,” US officials, US property,
along with anything with the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.” For most crimes of terrorism
there will be some offense under US law that can be charged whenever the terrorism touches our shores
or our overseas interests.
The fifth category, “universal jurisdiction,” refers to the power of any nation to punish offenses that
transgress against the universal law of nations. The Restatement describes this as the authority to “define
and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal
concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes and perhaps
certain acts of terrorism.”53
Universal jurisdiction has been used as the basis for creation of international tribunals to deal with
war crimes in situations when the persons or state most affected were not viewed by the international
community as being up to the task, such as tribunals created for Rwanda and Yugoslavia. Virtually the
only nation that has avowedly used “universal jurisdiction” as a heading for its own criminal prosecutions
is Israel’s use of the concept to try Nazi leaders for offenses that occurred on other territory before the
State of Israel existed. Historically, universal jurisdiction could also have been part of the justification for
“police actions” against pirates and slave traders. The Restatement contemplates this prospect by allowing
a nation to “punish noncompliance . . . by police or other nonjudicial action.”54
It may be noteworthy that the US has not made a general claim of universal jurisdiction regarding any
49

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS §§402 - 404
50

18 USC §7
51

The Restatement expresses this principle by insisting that every application of national law be tested against the
question of whether “exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable” with a list of factors to be considered. This
formulation may work well in application of civil law but it is rather loose and vague for application of criminal
penalties. Due process may well require more specificity, subject to prosecutorial discretion if a particular
prosecution would offend the interests of another nation.
52

18 USC §2332b
53

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS §404 (emphasis added).
54

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS §401.
14

offenses. Given the expansive reading that can be given to US interests in such matters as “foreign
commerce,” however, particularly in the globalized economy, the issue of universal jurisdiction may be of
little consequence other than as it affects the use of military commissions for prosecution of a crime
“against the law of nations.”
Another important question is whether US intrusion into another nation’s territory to apprehend or
“punish” an offender is justified under international law, which could be incorporated into domestic law.
Extradition from another country is subject to whatever treaty arrangements exist between the two
countries. In most instances, good politics more than law will dictate the wisdom of having either the
consent of that nation or an international sanction, such as UN resolution, in place before any such
enforcement action occurs.55 The propriety of using military force to capture or kill a suspected terrorist
in another country is beyond the scope of this article.
The Department of Justice Task Force on Terrorism has an informal list of 148 federal statutes that
can be considered when deciding what criminal offenses to charge in a terrorism case. In addition, federal
law defines a “federal crime of terrorism” as violation of any of 39 statutes when the “offense is
calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate
against government conduct.”56 There are also federal statutes defining offenses of providing financing
for terrorism, providing material support for terrorists,57 and providing material support for terrorist
58
organizations. The implications of these statutes are also beyond the scope of this article.
3. Sabotage and Spying
The Quirin opinion relied on historical antecedents stemming from the exigencies of war-time
conditions (essentially battlefield trials of alleged spies) and from a quid -pro-quo comparison of alleged
saboteurs to US soldiers. We should attempt to determine whether these or similar considerations apply to
alleged members of terrorist organizations and also whether international law has criminalized terrorist
behavior in such fashion as to indicate what sort of tribunal should conduct the trials.
The historic examples that the Supreme Court used in Quirin had the distinguishing characteristic of
having occurred mostly under battlefield conditions. The Court cited 11 cases of persons convicted as
spies by courts-martial and executed during the Revolutionary War. These proceedings were conducted
under the authority of a Resolution of the Continental Congress, which was later converted to statutory
form. The original resolution and statute applied to “alien spies.” The Court also mentions seven cases in
which there may not have even been a court martial but just summary execution by authority of the field
commander.
Three persons were tried by courts-martial for spying during the War of 1812, one was hanged, one
acquitted, and the third was convicted but then “released by President Madison on the ground that he was
an American citizen.”
55
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The statute was amended in 1862 to apply not just to aliens but to any person on the ground that
almost all combatants in the Civil War (and those civilians likely to aid them) were actually US citizens,
and it would not make sense to subject an Englishman to military justice but not the South Carolinian
who was doing the same thing to the forces of the Union.59 In other words, the enemies were citizens and
the circumstances were indisputably war.
A potentially significant issue arose a year later when the 1863 Conscription Act expanded the areas
to which this provision would extend. From 1775 to 1863, the scope of military jurisdiction extended to
those “lurking as spies in or about the fortifications or encampments of the armies of the United States.”
The 1863 Act extended to “in or about any of the fortifications, posts, quarters, or encampments of any of
the Armies of the United States, or elsewhere.” A motion to strike the phrase “or elsewhere” failed and
the language has remained since.60
One other change from the original versions of the spy provision was made during codification in
1912 when the phrase “shall be triable” was converted without explanation to “shall be tried.” ColonelProfessor Morgan notes that the change was not even disclosed to Congress when voting on the
codification and that it could remove discretion from the executive branch to take either the military
course or the civilian course of trial for treason.61
a. Citizen Spies and Alien Spies
Colonel-Professor Morgan argues forcefully that it is within Congress’ power to subject a citizen spy
to the same military authority as the alien spy. Congress has the power to raise an army, to define offenses
against the law of nations, and to make rules and regulations for the governance of the military. So far as
jury trial is concerned, there is pre-Constitution precedent for treating the offense of spying as “arising
within the land and naval forces” so as to be exempted by the Sixth Amendment.
Morgan believed that the more important issue was the breadth of the power to subject a citizen to
court-martial, the issue raised in the addition of the phrase “or elsewhere” in 1863. He was writing in
1920 with reference to the conditions of WWI and noted that much of the nation was mobilized for the
war effort by making and supplying everything from munitions to food and clothing, while also keeping
open channels of communication and transportation on which the military would rely along with the rest
of the country. “Under such circumstances, the zone of operations in truth and in fact comprehends the
entire country.”
The “zone of operations” was an attempt to distinguish the act of spying from that of tourism. What is
it that makes gathering information punishable by death? In the 18th and 19th Centuries, military
encampments and posts were easily identifiable and there was little motivation to gather information
about those encampments other than for nefarious reasons. Conversely, there was little motivation for
anyone to attack anything else and so no proscription on gathering information about civilian
establishments. In the context of WWI, when Morgan was writing, and even more so during WWII, when
the entire industrial complex was mobilized for support of the war effort, the zone of operations could
have been significantly blurred.
Colonel Morgan, however, remained unconvinced. He asserted that the citizen spy is engaged in
treason, which must be tried in the civilian courts with a jury, unless “in the theatre of operations or any
59
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other area subject to the actual control and dominion of the military.” Only in this way can the act be
deemed to “arise in the land or naval forces.” He conceded that modern conditions of armaments and
supply were moving toward a day when the “zone of operations [could] include the entire area of a
belligerent country.” Referring to Milligan, however, he believed that the term should be limited to the
“theatre of actual hostilities, the lines of communication, and the reserves and service of supply under
actual military control, and that it cannot properly be enlarged to cover the farms, factories and workshops
under exclusively civilian control.”62
The counter position to Colonel-Professor Morgan was the opinion of Colonel-Professor Wambaugh,
who wrote as Judge Advocate General that the civilian spy was punishable by death as a threat to military
operations.63 In fact, Colonel-Professor Wambaugh asserted that a spy is not a criminal unless a citizen.
The alien spy, he claimed, might actually be engaged in a brave and honorable act but is still shot because
of the threat to the military, just as a soldier in uniform would be shot without the luxury even of court
martial trial. To Wambaugh, the concept of a treasonous crime which could also be the subject of a court
martial noncrime was not disturbing. To Morgan, however, the crime of treason was so heavily protected
by constitutional prescriptions of trial by jury and evidence, that only an act within the immediate vicinity
of military control could justify abandoning those prescriptions.
The debate between Colonel-Professors Morgan and Wambaugh is instructive for the proposition that
almost a century ago experts were already beginning to realize that time of war could involve most of a
belligerent country. But even then, at least some voices were heard to argue for recourse to the civilian
courts. The reasons advanced had to do with constitutional guarantees. The heart of the matter seems to
have been that there are such significant constitutional guarantees surrounding the crime of “treason” that
it would be foolhardy to bypass those guarantees by remitting the accused to military power.
In addition to constitutional guarantees, I would add the thought that it is critically important to the
national psyche today to see our civilian processes as up to the task of defending our freedoms S both
physical freedom and legal civil liberties. If the terrorist can change our ways of life, then we have lost.
Moreover, the offense of spying exists under military law only in time of war. Information gathering for
the purpose of destroying a building or taking life during peacetime may be an act in furtherance of a
conspiracy to commit murder or other crimes, but it is not spying. Here is a clear example of the
importance of deciding what it means to be at war or whether there is some other status between war and
peace.
b. Citizen Saboteurs and Suppliers of the Enemy
The prior section dealt with the phenomenon of spying, which essentially consists of gathering
information. Curiously enough, it was the basis for the Court’s decision in Quirin with regard to planned
sabotage. The person who already has information on where to plant a bomb and is captured with
explosives in hand may not be a spy. He may be bent on murder or destruction of property, but the
principal reason that the language of spying has been borrowed is that he is moving clandestinely and out
of uniform toward his target. That may make him an unlawful combatant under the international law of
war, but there is a provision in the UCMJ that also should be considered.
Article 106 declares that “any person who aids . . . the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies,
money, or other things . . shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court martial or military
commission may direct.”64 If we carried the Wambaugh theory to this provision, then supplying of money
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to “charities” that aid a terrorist organization could subject an individual to trial by military commission.
We are not entirely without precedent for construction of this provision. In several cases in the postCivil War era involving persons who were trading with Indian tribes, it became apparent that the principal
difficulty would be in determining when a “state of war” existed with a particular tribe or band. The
Attorney General declared that this section could be triggered when there were armed conflicts occurring
between those tribes and US military forces.65 It might be tempting to assert that a state of hostility
between the US and a group of people such as Al-Qaeda is similar to the conditions of hostility with some
Indian tribes in the late 19th Century. The analogy fails, however, on a couple of fronts. First, a particular
Indian tribe would be defined by a common ethnic and cultural heritage that is vastly more homogeneous
than what is likely to exist with most terrorist groups.66 Secondly, although Indian tribes did not attempt
to stake out very precise borders of their territory, they clearly had claims of right to areas that constituted
their homelands. Thirdly, a point that is of much greater significance than might be imagined, the Indian
tribes can be considered similar to nation-states for the simple reason that the European settlers regarded
them as at least resembling nations for purposes of international dealings, for example in treaty
negotiations and cession of territory.67
4. Treason and its Derivatives
The law of treason has not been widely studied in a very long time, but it may offer us some
interesting insights. The Framers were so concerned about the potential misuses of treason charges that
this is the only “crime” which is given special treatment in the Constitution.68 The Treason Clause builds
extremely high barricades against prosecution for this “heinous” crime, so the question becomes whether
those barricades can be circumvented by creating other crimes, or by calling the traitor something else
such as an “enemy combatant.” To be grossly flippant, could we avoid restrictions on prosecution for
treason by calling it jaywalking? and the answer turns out to be yes, we can! But there is nothing to
indicate that we can avoid conducting public trials for jaywalking.
Article III’s “peculiar phraseology observable in the definition of” treason, and “the equally stringent
feature” requiring two eyewitness’ testimony of the same overt act, have been said to flow from the
Framers’ discomfort with “abuses . . . under the tyrannical reigns of the Tudors and the Stuarts.”69 In
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particular, the Framers were reacting to the concept of “constructive treason” by which anyone who spoke
in support of, or was friendly with those who expressed, resistance to policies of the Crown could be
accused of treason. Indeed, it is not likely that even the Tudors and Stuarts would have had an easy time
of tossing a citizen into jail indefinitely on the mere say-so of a military officer. That they did so on
occasion led directly to our constitutional language preventing the possibility.
Is it possible to square this history with the “enemy combatant” concept employed by the Supreme
Court in Quirin and leading to the Bush Military Order? The answer is “not very easily,” and the lessons
to be learned are not very clear. The Treason Clause creates two categories of treason: levying war against
the United States, and providing aid and comfort to the enemy. In the first there must be an armed
assemblage and the second requires an enemy.
Chief Justice Marshall gave us our first instruction in the operation of the Treason Clause in Ex parte
Bollman,70 dealing with some of the alleged conspirators in the Burr escapade. Some of his discussion is
71
so pertinent that it is set out at length below. Marshall distinguished strongly between treason and
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Id. at 126 - 127:
To constitute that specific crime for which the prisoners now before the court have been committed,
war must be actually levied against the United States. However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to
subvert by force the government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war,
and actually to levy war, are distinct offences. The first must be brought into operation by the assemblage
of men for a purpose treasonable in itself, or the fact of levying war cannot have been committed. So far
has this principle been carried, that, in a case reported by Ventris, and mentioned in some modern treatises
on criminal law, it has been determined that the actual enlistment of men to serve against the government
does not amount to levying war. It is true that in that case the soldiers enlisted were to serve without the
realm, but they were enlisted within it, and if the enlistment for a treasonable purpose could amount to
levying war, then war had been actually levied.
It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be guilty of this crime who has not
appeared in arms against his country. On the contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be
actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any
part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the
general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors. But there must be an actual assembling of men for the
treasonable purpose, to constitute a levying of war.
Crimes so atrocious as those which have for their object the subversion by violence of those laws and
those institutions which have been ordained in order to secure the peace and happiness of society, are not to
escape punishment because they have not ripened into treason. The wisdom of the legislature is competent
to provide for the case; and the framers of our constitution, who not only defined and limited the crime, but
with jealous circumspection attempted to protect their limitation by providing that no person should be
convicted of it, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open
court, must have conceived it more safe that punishment in such cases should be ordained by general laws,
formed upon deliberation, under the influence of no resentments, and without knowing on whom they were
to operate, than that it should be inflicted under the influence of those passions which the occasion seldom
fails to excite, and which a flexible definition of the crime, or a construction which would render it flexible,
might bring into operation. It is therefore more safe as well as more consonant to the principles of our
constitution, that the crime of treason should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases; and that
crimes not clearly within the constitutional definition, should receive such punishment as the legislature in
its wisdom may provide.
To complete the crime of levying war against the United States, there must be an actual assemblage of
men for the purpose of executing a treasonable design. In the case now before the court, a design to
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conspiracy: “However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert by force the government of
our country, such conspiracy is not treason.” It must be remembered, however, that the Burr escapade did
not involve a foreign enemy, so there was no occasion for him to deal with the offense of providing aid
and comfort to the enemy.
Marshall went on to deal with our very question. Although “to complete the crime of levying war
against the United States, there must be an actual assemblage of men for the purpose of executing a
treasonable design,” he expressed the view that the legislature could define other offenses to which the
strictures of the Treason Clause would not apply. The Framers were concerned about the passions that the
thought of treason would engender, but they could have been comfortable with the thought that “crimes
not clearly within the constitutional definition, should receive such punishment as the legislature in its
wisdom may provide.”
In a number of cases stemming from the Civil War, the judges expanded Marshall’s view of
conspiracy to state that there could be no such concept as an accessory to treason because an act was
either treason or not.72 They consistently recognized the differences between the two kinds of treason, the
first depending on whether the defendant has taken up arms,73 the second consisting of providing material
support to a recognized enemy. It is familiar ground that President Lincoln attempted to use the military
courts for prosecution of Southern sympathizers, leading eventually to the opinion in Milligan. For the
remainder of the story, we become embroiled in the tripartite struggle for power among the President
(Andrew Johnson), the Court (Taney, then Chase), and Congress (Radical Republican by 1865). In
Thorington v. Smith,74 the Court dealt with the question of whether debts payable in Confederate currency
were still valid as between two individuals (and, thus, payable in US currency after the war ended). Chief
Justice Chase distinguished among different levels of de facto governments. At one extreme would be a
solidly established actual government such that “adherents to it in war against the government de jure do
not incur the penalties of treason.” The government of the Confederacy, he said, was sufficiently
established that it obtained “actual supremacy, however unlawfully gained, in all matters of government
within its military lines.”
That supremacy did not justify acts of hostility to the United States. How far it should excuse
them must be left to the lawful government upon the re-establishment of its authority. But it made
obedience to its authority, in civil and local matters, not only a necessity but a duty. Without such
obedience, civil order was impossible.75
By this language, Chase was implying that there could be no prosecution for providing aid and
comfort to the enemy by a person residing within the military control of the Confederacy. As we know,
overturn the government of the United States in New-Orleans by force, would have been unquestionably a
design which, if carried into execution, would have been treason, and the assemblage of a body of men for
the purpose of carrying it into execution would amount to levying of war against the United States; but no
conspiracy for this object, no enlisting of men to effect it, would be an actual levying of war.
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there were no such prosecutions. Moreover, when Congress attempted to punish former active rebels by
forfeiture of their property, the President decreed that a Presidential pardon worked to prevent forfeiture
and the Court sided with the President.76 There is little more that we can make of the Civil War
experience with regard to the ability of Congress to decree punishment for the sympathizers and
supporters of foreign enemies, so we now fast-forward to World War I.
77
The seminal case in First Amendment law is Schenck v. United States. Schenck and his cohorts
were convicted of conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917, which made it unlawful to “cause
insubordination . . . in the military and naval forces of the United States, and to obstruct the recruiting and
enlistment service of the United States.” Justice Holmes’ famous opinion for the Court, after using the
analogy of “falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater,” stated:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation
is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as
protected by any constitutional right. It seems to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of the
recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect might be enforced.
The statute of 1917 in § 4 punishes conspiracies to obstruct as well as actual obstruction. If the
act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency and the intent with which it is done are the
same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.
Before Schenck was decided, Congress had already responded to the emerging level of dissension
regarding U.S. entry into the war in Europe by passing the 1918 amendments to the Espionage Act. Under
the amendments, it was unlawful to “urge, incite, or advocate” actions that could disrupt the war effort.78
The majority of the Court found that an intent to disrupt the war effort was sufficient to uphold conviction
under the statute. Justice Holmes, joined by Brandeis, dissented with the famous “marketplace of ideas”
analysis. The combination of opinions sounds as if the majority were treating the statute as if it were a
finding by Congress of “clear and present danger.” The interesting point for our purposes is that nobody
questioned whether Congress could define crimes that came very close to “providing aid and comfort to
the enemy” without requiring two witnesses to the same overt act. It seems that in this stage, Congress
and the Court had accepted Chief Justice Marshall’s invitation to Congress to define non-treason offenses.
The only World War II case in the Supreme Court on the subject of Treason was Cramer v. United
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Each of the first three counts charged the defendants with conspiring, when the United States was at war with
the Imperial Government of Germany, to unlawfully utter, print, write and publish: In the first count,
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to the prosecution of the war." The offenses were charged in the language of the act of Congress.
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States,79 a follow-up to Quirin. One of the eight German saboteurs, Thiel, had a friend in the US named
Cramer, who was German by birth and a naturalized US citizen. Thiel contacted Cramer in New York,
met with him twice in public places, and gave Cramer some money to hold for him. Cramer testified that
he suspected Thiel was here as a propagandist for the German government, but there was no evidence that
Cramer suspected anything of the violent intentions of the saboteurs. Cramer was convicted of treason.80
The basic question presented to the Supreme Court was whether an overt act in furtherance of treason
needed to be done with intent by the defendant of furthering enemy action against the government, or
whether an innocent overt act could be treasonous because of its role in the enemy’s plan.
Justice Jackson’s majority opinion in Cramer has received surprisingly little attention.81 He
canvassed the history of treason prosecutions from English law through the colonial era, pointing out that
much of the turbulence of those periods could lead to a citizen’s being caught between competing
loyalties and this subject to treason from two different sides. The Framers built protections against treason
prosecutions to guard against two dangers: “(1) perversion by established authority to repress peaceful
political opposition; and (2) conviction of the innocent as a result of perjury, passion or inadequate
evidence.”82 The critical passage for definition of criminal behavior is this:
Thus the crime of treason consists of two elements: adherence to the enemy; and rendering
him aid and comfort. A citizen intellectually or emotionally may favor the enemy and harbor
sympathies or convictions disloyal to this country’s policy or interest, but so long as he commits
no act of aid and comfort to the enemy, there is no treason. On the other hand, a citizen may take
actions which do aid and comfort the enemy S making a speech critical of the government or
opposing its measures, profiteering, striking in defense plants or essential work, and the hundred
other things which impair our cohesion and diminish our strength S but if there is no adherence to
the enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, there is no treason.83
Applying these thoughts to the evidence, Jackson pointed out that the prosecution had “withdrawn”
the safekeeping of money as an overt act to be submitted to the jury.84 That left only the two meetings
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testimony described the money transaction while denying that he knew the purpose of the money or the purpose of
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with Thiel that were corroborated by eyewitness testimony. These could not be said to have shown either
furtherance of a scheme sufficient to prove either aid or adherence to the enemy. By contrast, the money
transaction, if proved by the requisite testimony, would have made “a quite different case.”85 Finally,
Justice Jackson addressed the Government’s arguments for relaxing the standards related to treason:
The Government has urged that our initial interpretation of the treason clause should be less
exacting, lest treason be too hard to prove and the Government disabled from adequately
combating the techniques of modern warfare. But the treason offense is not the only nor can it
well serve as the principal legal weapon to vindicate our national cohesion and security. In
debating this provision, Rufus King observed to the Convention that the “controversy relating to
Treason might be of less magnitude than was supposed; as the legislature might punish capitally
under other names than Treason.” His statement holds good today. Of course we do not intimate
that Congress could dispense with the two-witness rule merely by giving the same offense
another name. But the power of Congress is in no way limited to enact prohibitions of specified
acts thought detrimental to our wartime safety.86
Congress, with the assistance of many subsequent administrations, has accepted this invitation by
enacting many statutes that relate to providing aid and comfort to those who threaten the public safety of
the United States. Perhaps the most directly relevant are those that criminalize “Providing Material
Support to Terrorists”87 and “Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated Terrorist
88
Organizations.” There are also crimes, such as what John Walker Lindh pleaded guilty to, defined as
violations of Presidential directives blocking trading with, or providing services to, regimes designated in
time of national emergency.89 Given the history of the Treason Clause, and particularly Justices
Marshall’s and Jackson’s invitations to Congress, there can be little doubt about the validity of these
statutes, except insofar as they might in some situations be subject to first amendment restrictions.
But does the ability of Congress to define crimes other than treason extend to the ability of the
military to imprison either with or without trial? There is no hint in any of this that the normal processes
of the civilian justice system should not apply to crimes undermining the public safety just because there
are foreign connections to the crime.
D. Global Federalism S KKK and AlQaeda
Thiel’s presence in the US. Id. at 5.
85
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Id. at 45.
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Under current federal law, the use of military commissions for trial of alleged terrorists depends on
finding that an alleged offense constitutes a violation of the “law of war.”90 More generally, the question
of whether to apply military law to terrorism implicates other questions that are important for those who
wish to believe that the international arena has developed coherent norms for the conduct of warfare,
questions such as with whom are we at war? what are the rules of engagement for a war that is against an
ideological group rather than a national group?
It is no accident that the history of the United States is roughly contemporaneous with the
development of modern international law, a development that was fueled by the Europeans’ Age of
Colonialism and its demise.91 For most of that history, international law has been seen as rules or norms
that pertain to relations among nations.92 Until recently, the world has held to a dichotomous distinction
between the processes of warfare and those of the civilian criminal system. War was something that took
place between nations, involved an effort to kill or capture enemy combatants, and thus provided no
occasion for making considered judgments about the culpability of someone on the other side.93 By
contrast, those who are suspected of committing crimes against the law of a nation were treated as
individuals whose culpability must be judged in an individualized proceeding.
The lines between warfare and criminal processes have blurred because of changes in approach both
by the enforcers of peace and the perpetrators of violence. The peacemakers have attempted to use
processes patterned from criminal law to punish violations of respected rules of warfare,94 while the
90
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perpetrators of violence have acted on their own outside the confines of government and those same rules
of warfare. The world’s search for a new paradigm to deal with these phenomena has produced
international commissions for prosecution of war crimes95 and is now engaged in defining responses to
96
terrorism.
The United States and Israel disagreed over whether the Egyptian expatriate who shot three people at
the El Al counter in LAX was a terrorist.97 The nations of the world have been at odds for decades over
the definition of terrorist and whether it constitutes a crime under international law.
The familiar theme of “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” has muddled the issue
enormously.98 As numerous authors have pointed out, this is an almost silly argument because universal
99
law criminalizes attacks on civilian populations without regard to the political motivations of the actor.
The difficulty is not whether there could be justification for an attack on civilians because legally there
cannot be. The difficulty is in determining by what process to respond to such an attack depending on the
degree of affiliation by the actor with a nation-state.
What distinguishes the “terrorist” from the ordinary street criminal with ties to an international
criminal organization? Take, for instance, a murder committed on the streets of an American city by a
drug dealer who knows in some vague way that his livelihood is linked to a well-organized and wellfunded cartel in Colombia or Afghanistan. Is this an act of terrorism? Is it an act of war? Is the US
justified in invading Colombia because there are organized criminals there who carry out violence on US
civilians? This has been the theme of at least two recent movies,100 both carrying the message that US
war crimes. Prior to that time, “victor’s justice” had been meted out at the national level. Gerry J. Simpson, War
Crimes: A Critical Introduction, in MCCORMACK & SIMPSON, THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 5 (1997).
95
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involvement in Colombia would be permissible only with the permission of the Colombian government,
certainly the correct answer under international law. Meanwhile, international law is creating cooperative
efforts to deal with the transborder aspects of large criminal organizations without promoting intrusion
into the internal affairs of any one nation.101
On the global stage, what distinguishes Jose Padilla from Terry McVeigh? Assuming the facts as
disclosed in press releases about Padilla, both were motivated by extreme hatred for the US government,
both were planning mass civilian casualties at governmental centers. Padilla was in league with foreign
citizens, but what does this signify? How do we distinguish him from alleged Mafiosi, or drug dealers in
league with Colombian cartels?
The difficulty in remitting Padilla, or even Hamdi, to the military is not just that the Supreme Court
has expressed distrust of military tribunals, which it certainly has, but also that the law abhors
incoherence. If there is no rational distinguishing principle among these examples, and if the choice of
military or civilian trial is pure executive whim, then we are left with unbridled executive discretion that
is more than just uncomfortable S it at least verges on a level of incoherence that due process itself would
prevent.
The post Civil War federalism experience of the US offers some very sensible guidance at this point.
Indeed, for this author, the current situation on a global scale makes the concerns of that era much more
readily understandable than they had been to this point. For 150 years, the federal courts have struggled
with criminal, civil rights and conspiracy statutes that make federal jurisdiction over an incident turn on
whether the actor acted “under color of state law.” In some instances, the KKK or related miscreants were
sufficiently aligned with local governmental officials to make this finding, while in others the “private
citizen” could escape federal jurisdiction for lack of any connection to a governmental official or agency.
Given the power of racial discrimination, particularly in the South through at least the 1960’s, it was very
difficult for many to understand why the governmental connection needed to be made. Now I for one can
see the point.
The Reconstruction statutes created two classes of federal crimes for interference with “any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States:” those committed “under color
of law”102 and those committed by combination of two or more persons.103
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The “color of law” provision came safely within the “state action” requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was in turn an expression that the federal government operated on the states and not
directly on the citizenry at large.104 The conspiracy statute, however, presented a bit of a conundrum. If
the Fourteenth Amendment operated only against the states, how could Congress criminalize private
behavior? The few cases actually using this criminal provision thus far have found either that the
perpetrators were acting “in concert” with state officials or acted in direct contravention of defined federal
interests, such as federal instrumentalities of commerce.105
Many commentators, and some Justices of the Supreme Court, have thought that these limitations
were unduly restrictive of federal power. In particular, because the statutes arose out of widespread
concern over the lack of state enforcement against the Ku Klux Klan, it could be argued that the federal
government should be able to criminalize any behavior that has an impact on racial minorities.106
With the international experience with terrorism in mind, perhaps it makes more sense to realize that
the difficulty with federalizing crime is essentially one of line-drawing. Without some “color of state law”
or a federally-defined right at stake, how does one distinguish the KKK “terrorist” from the ordinary
street criminal who also carries racial animosity for his victims?
The primary federal interest in the post-Civil War Era was the unwillingness of state governments to
take steps to enforce the law against the KKK or similar groups. The resulting violence against US
citizens (newly defined as such by the Fourteenth Amendment) gave rise to a collective interest among
other states to enforce legal controls against state-sanctioned violence. The primary federal interest in the
KKK or similar groups today lies in the greater psychological (as well as physical) impact of a large,
concerted, organized group with common means of carrying out their hostility.
Identical statements can be made with regard to terrorism. The international interest in terrorism lies
in the greater psychological (as well as physical) impact of a large, concerted, organized group with
common means of carrying out their hostility. The international community is based in a respect for the
individual sovereignty of nations that is even greater than that of the federal respect for state sovereignty
in the US. Given that respect, the international law does not need to intrude into the internal affairs of a
nation to deal with ordinary street criminals. It is when a large, organized and well-funded group appears
on the scene with the means to wreak widespread psychological and physical harm that the international
interest is triggered. This leads to the international corollary of federalist-defined offenses: either when
the actor is clothed with some semblance of “state authority” or the conspiracy is sufficiently large to be a
concern of the international community.
Under this view, an act may be a personal act of “terrorism” (as in the Israeli view of the LAX
Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the
same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent
or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured
104
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shooter) without triggering the international concern of “terrorism” for lack of state involvement or lack
of a well-organized group identity. This is the position taken by the FBI in the case of the LAX shooter
and it makes a great deal of sense from the international perspective.
To carry out the analogy, consider the case of John Paul Franklin, who acted alone in shooting two
white men who were in the company of two African-American women and who also engaged in other
racially-motivated behavior.107 Should he have been charged with a federal crime or left to the state
criminal justice system? This is a very close case in US law. For the federal government to intervene
might imply an unhealthy lack of respect for state justice, but for the federal government to ignore the
situation could be seen as expressing a lack of concern for the racial issues of the country. In the end, it
may have been the flamboyance of Franklin’s racial attitudes that tipped the scales to federal prosecution
because of the potential contagion of his racism, but the federal nexus of authority was the “use of public
facilities” by the victims.108
Crimes of violence often carry racial overtones. It is often impossible to say that any one motivation
is the sole force in driving a person to violence. Any ordinary street crime may have an element of racial
hostility buried within it. For the federal government to pick and choose those that it will prosecute,
without any guiding principle for its decisions, would be contrary to the rationality that we demand of our
criminal justice system. Thus, distinctions in American civil rights law that depend on “state action” (state
sponsorship would be the analogy in terrorism) or “conspiracy” (a large terrorist organization) make sense
from the point of view of importing rationality into what might otherwise become decisions based on
whim, or the identity of the victim, or even the color of the defendant’s skin.
This line of analogy leads in the field of terrorism to considering a terrorist act to be a violation of the
“law of war” only if carried out with state sanction. It might also be a violation of international law (the
“law of nations”) but that only serves to provide universal jurisdiction for the courts of any nation; it does
not indicate which court system within the US structure should take jurisdiction. For that, we need a
rational distinction such as state sponsorship.
Now the use of the “color of state law” requirement in the post-Civil War legislation begins to make
more sense. The limitation of federal power to actors who were in league with governmental agents was a
very rational way of confining the operation of law. Similarly, limiting application of military authority to
actors who are in league with foreign governmental agents is a rational limiting principle, one that courts
can apply with confidence.
There is another limiting principle available, but we must wonder whether the courts can apply it with
the requisite level of confidence. The most likely limit is that of “member of a terrorist organization,”
which imports criteria of political motivation, organized group behavior, and funding capabilities to reach
international targets. If Congress plainly authorized military tribunals for actors who meet these criteria,
and if the government were willing to show to a court in habeas corpus that an individual meets these
criteria, it is likely that the court will accede to the government’s demand for military authority. To claim
that the courts have no review power over these criteria is utterly disingenuous. Even in Quirin the courts
received evidence of the behavior of the German saboteurs showing that they were acting under direction
and in the service of a foreign enemy.
Thus, by foregoing the claim of immunity from habeas corpus review, the government can construct
an argument that an individual falls within the modern definition of pirate S i.e., a terrorist. We should
not, however, confuse the subject by using the language of war. These people are not combatants in
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armed conflict between nations. They are in a category of criminal that arguably places them within the
domain of the military, but they are also criminals who could be referred to the ordinary processes of the
civilian justice system.
The difficulty is that the only statutory basis for military tribunals at this point is “violation of the law
of war.” And just as the KKK did not violate federal law if not acting “under color of state law,” on the
world stage a terrorist does not violate the law of war unless acting “under color of state authority.” How
else can we distinguish the terrorist from the mafiosi?
It is at this stage that Professor Paust is most persuasive. The whole message of the western world to
the rest of the world is that democratic civilian processes are better than a mere show of force. A critical
factor in being “better” is the rationality by which different handling of different cases can be explained
by public policies. Another factor is the transparent fairness of civilian systems of justice with attendant
due process. Although the current state of law might justify acceptance of the argument that the terrorist
should be subject to military justice, it would be a mistake to do so and give up the moral high ground
that serves as the underpinnings of our claim to international accord.
E. Military Commissions and Unlawful Combatants
Next, we need to consider what the international law of warfare has to say about persons who attempt
to inflict destruction on a particular nation and its inhabitants. One reason for delving into this topic is that
much of the discussion of spies and comforters of the enemy draws on the law of war as justification for
treating these as military matters rather than crimes of treason or other civilly defined offenses.
Colonel Winthrop begins from the proposition that the law of war is limited to the “theatre of
operations” and sets out a frame of reference for the citizens of belligerent states.109 “[U]pon the
declaration or initiation of war,” he says, “not only the opposed military forces but all the inhabitants of
the belligerent nations . . . become . . . the enemies both of the adverse governments and of each other.”
Civilian enemies, however, are not necessarily combatants. The civilian is disempowered from
trading with civilian enemies and is at risk of having his property destroyed or seized if it is useful to the
enemy, but a noncombatant is not to be subjected to personal violence. Among the few reasonably
consistent edicts of warfare throughout recorded history are the rules protecting noncombatants. In
modern times, those rules have extended to those engaged in medical or spiritual support of combatants. It
is a clear violation of the law of war to target noncombatants, although obviously civilian casualties have
been heavy in some instances of bombing. The justification advanced by the US for civilian casualties of
bombing is that it is the other side’s choice of where to place military industrial targets and that if we
target those structures, then the “collateral damage” to civilian populations is not our fault.
The principal gray area for noncombatants is in the category of “camp followers” or “retainers.”
Civilian employees of the military are subject to capture just as if they were prisoners of war and are to be
treated as such, but they are not to be subjected to violence so long as they do not threaten violence
themselves. Winthrop states that “[c]amp followers, although they may be made prisoners, are to be
treated as noncombatants.”
Winthrop deals rather cursorily with the question of “THE FORCES BY WHICH WAR IS TO BE
WAGED” and states “the general rule that the operations of war on land can legally be carried on only
through the recognized armies or soldiery of the State as duly enlisted or employed in its service.” He has
a special place for “irregulars” or “guerillas.” “Irregular armed bodies or persons not forming part of the
organized forces of a belligerent, or operating under the orders of its established commanders, are not in
general recognized as legitimate troops or entitled, when taken, to be treated as prisoners of war but may
upon capture be summarily punished even with death.”110 This is a surprisingly harsh statement in a text
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generally attempting to place more civilized and humane boundaries on the conduct of warfare, and the
explanation can be found in the image that he portrays of marauding bands inside the enemy’s borders
“killing, disabling and robbing of peaceable citizens or soldiers . . . from motives mostly of personal
profit or revenge.”111 The picture of undisciplined, nonuniformed persons wreaking havoc upon civilians
and blending back into civilian populations is Winthrop’s contribution to the earliest depiction of what
today we might call a terrorist.
This depiction is significantly different from the image one has of a citizen defending his homeland
against an invading force. Would we really expect summary execution of a person captured while
shooting back at invaders from inside his home? The 1949 Geneva Convention dealt explicitly with this
phenomenon by including within the definition of prisoners of war, and thus protected from summary
punishment, both organized militias which “conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war” and those “inhabitants of a non occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading force” [emergency defense of home].112 What evolved
between the 19th Century and the end of WWII, it appears, is a sense that the treatment of a person
depends more on how that person behaved during warfare than on the official status of the person.
The 1949 Geneva Convention recognizes that rules are one thing and application another by
providing that if there is any doubt about whether a person belongs to the protected categories, then “such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been
determined by a competent tribunal.”113 The companion Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons provides that there shall be no reprisals and that no “protected person may be punished for an
offence he or she has not personally committed.”114
The upshot of all this is that individuals who are captured in the course of military action in another
country must be treated as prisoners of war or civilians unless they were engaged in clandestine use of
arms without the excuse of emergency defense of home. According to Winthrop, who probably had a
good feel for the “customs and usages” of war, a person clandestinely using arms without the emergency
home defense excuse could have been summarily executed upon capture. There can be little doubt that the
customs and usages have changed in the past century to the point that no summary executions are allowed
under any circumstances. Indeed, the most recent statements on war crimes would make it a crime to
“pass sentence or execute anyone who is hors de combat without previous judgement by a regularly
constituted court.”115
II. Detention Without Trial

Id. at 783.
111

Id. at 784.
112

GPW art. 4.
113

GPW art. 5.
114

Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons art. 33
115

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, §8(2)(c)(4).
30

If the detainees are alien combatants in a war against the US, then there is no crime in taking up arms
against the US. In a sense, this is the flip side of the reasons why these people are not prisoners of war.
The question for this group is simply at what point must they be repatriated?
On the other hand, citizens who are alleged to have taken up arms against the US essentially are
accused of treason, which may also be a subject of military law if the appropriate jurisdictional elements
are met. There are also practical arguments for allowing the military to detain indefinitely, such as
preventive detention, detention to assist interrogation, or avoiding disclosure of classified information.
Although some of these approach justification of military detention of “enemy combatants,” none is
sufficiently persuasive to undermine the fundamental bedrock of Anglo-American concepts of due
process entitling an accused to a hearing on specified charges before a competent tribunal.
A. Indeterminate Duration of Hostilities
One argument for detention without trial could track closely the analogy of war. Because the
suspected terrorist is part of a group that has promised continuing hostile action, the members of the
group can hardly be turned loose to help carry out that promise. Prisoners of war are detained for the
duration of hostilities because it would be foolish to send them back to have another chance to kill people
on our side. This is a compelling argument if we can be sure that the person to whom it applies is in fact
committed to taking violent action.
Criminology has put substantial effort into the predictability of the violent offender, or at least of
identifying the factors that tend toward anti-social behavior. Young males are far more likely to commit
violent crimes than any other group.116 Perhaps violence would be reduced dramatically if we could just
warehouse all males between the ages of 16 and 30. In a more serious vein, the “idea of incapacitation is
simply that offenders separated from society will not be able to inflict harms on innocent people during
the period of their incarceration.”117 There are many students who argue against repeat offender laws on
the basis that they tend to apply only to those offenders who are already nearing the end of their criminal
careers.118
There are two problems with the incapacitation model in criminal law. One is that the predictive
factors are still just too uncertain to allow anyone to make more than just an educated guess about
whether a particular person is likely to commit a violent crime. Even the principles of rehabilitation and
parole have fallen on hard times in recent decades. The second problem is that the very idea of predictive
incapacitation conflicts with our deeply held values of free will. We want desperately to believe that even
the most likely offender can have a change of heart before harming innocent persons.
Indeed, it is this emphasis on free will that lies at the heart of conspiracy law. We don’t punish for
joining groups or even for planning a criminal act. We insist on an overt act in furtherance of the plan for
the very reason that we do not want to punish evil intent or proclivities without providing the opportunity
for the potential miscreant to “wise up.”
Suppose we decided to lock up a person just for being a member of a terrorist organization. The task
is daunting and the problems multiply rapidly. First of all, there are too many to be all-inclusive so the
effort will be highly select and arbitrary. Secondly, for each one that we treat in this fashion, we persuade
two or more fellow travelers to convert to the cause. Next, we cut off some of the most promising sources
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of information about the plans of terrorist organizations. Lastly, although we could probably go on and
on, this action would undercut the whole notion of free will and persuasion to peaceful dispute resolution.
All of this just relates to the question of whether we want to pursue the prospect of indefinite
detention without trial. The very idea is anathema to western notions of law and justice, but it has to be
mentioned. With regard to a person who has been proven guilty of active participation in a conspiracy,
whether in military or civilian trial, a very lengthy sentence may be appropriate. After all, the conspiracy
of terrorism is conspiracy to commit murder (and probably on a broad scale and probably of unknown
persons), so the prospect of near life imprisonment is not out of bounds. The emphasis here is on the need
to have a trial for an act S the question of sentence is another matter entirely.
B. Detention as Incentive To Talk
In one explanation of the Government’s position with respect to Hamdi, AG Ashcroft said that he
would be detained as an incentive to get him talking about his knowledge of the AlQaeda organization
and its future plans. Deal brokering with organized crime members is certainly not unknown, but it
usually takes place in the context of criminal trials. It can also lead to abuses in which government
officials end up protecting ongoing criminal activity to obtain information on other criminal activity.119
The major problem with indefinite detention to obtain information is that it flies in the face of basic
notions of due process, at least in the American system if not internationally. At the domestic level, it has
been said repeatedly that government cannot incarcerate someone without due process, meaning at least a
decision by a competent tribunal.
Although we can use incarceration as a method of coercing information from an individual in
American law, it is accomplished only by court order and then almost never carried out. In civil litigation,
for example, refusal to provide information in discovery can become the basis of a court order under Rule
37. Refusal to comply with the order can then be punished by contempt. Although in theory a court can
order a contumacious witness to be incarcerated until he or she complies,120 in practice this power is
rarely, if ever, exercised because the courts have other less intrusive remedies available and because
incarceration is surrounded by heavy procedural safeguards.121 If an individual can be shown to have
information to which a government agency has a right, then a court will order the individual to divulge
that information,122 and refusal to obey that court order could result in imprisonment for contempt of
123
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court. Contempt may also be used to coerce a witness to testify before a grand jury. But “the
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justification for coercive imprisonment as applied to civil contempt depends upon the ability of the
contemnor to comply with the court’s order” and “a court must exercise ‘the least possible power
adequate to the end proposed.’”125 In all of these example, the requirement of a court order at least
ensures a judicial check against governmental abuse in the quest for information, and in addition the
courts are adamant that incarceration be circumspectly applied if at all.
At the international level, there are a number of provisions that need to be considered. One is the
provision from the Geneva Convention that prisoners of war cannot be punished for wrongdoing without
a determination of wrongdoing by a competent tribunal. Another is the proscription on hostage taking that
has been built into several international treaties and conventions. Is the detainee essentially being held
hostage for information? The common sense idea of hostage taking is that the detained person is being
held until someone else is given up. But it could be argued that holding someone until he gives up
information in his own possession is no different.
The Supreme Court of Israel dealt with two levels of this argument in Anonymous v. Minister of
Defence.126 The unnamed petitioners were being held under the Israeli Emergency Powers
(Administrative Detention) Law of 1979, which has been in effect for over 30 years as an “emergency”
measure. It authorizes detention of persons as to whom “the Minister of Defence has reasonable cause to
believe that reasons of State security or public security require that a particular person be detained.” The
order of detention can be renewed every six months so long as the same findings are made. In the
Anonymous case, the government conceded that the individuals in custody no longer represented a threat
themselves (how this could be known is a mystery) but that they could be held as bargaining chips to
obtain information from terrorist groups about a missing Israeli soldier.
In its initial decision in this case, the Israeli Court held that there was nothing in Israeli law to counter
the grant of power to the Minister of Defence. With regard to basic human rights principles, the Court
merely said that it is the legislature’s job to create a “balance between freedom and dignity on one hand
and security on the other.” After severe criticism from a number of quarters, the Court granted a rehearing
and reversed itself. Noting that international law prohibits hostage-taking, the Court said that using a
detainee as a bargaining chip “comprises a serious infringement of human dignity.” The Court pointed out
that the detainees could not provide the desired information themselves and thus “detention of the
appellants is nothing other than a situation in which the key to a person’s prison is not held by him but by
others.”
But what if the information in fact were in the person’s own head? Would detention to persuade him
to talk still constitute an illegal hostage situation? This may be an interesting question in international
the case of administrative subpoenas, parties may immediately appeal district court orders enforcing these
subpoenas, as the Supreme Court has deemed them to be ‘self-contained, so far as the judiciary is concerned[.]’
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law, but it is virtually irrelevant to American law because the concept of administrative detention itself
has been unknown until now.
C. Detention To Prevent Violent Acts
Another argument for detention could be that the individual can be held because he represents a
danger to public safety, that if released he would be likely to commit an act of violence. Other than civil
commitment, the only detentions without conviction that American law has acknowledged have been
those for purposes of pre-trial proceedings or based on some judicial mechanism for preventing
administrative abuse. There are no cases on “administrative detention” in the United States for the simple
reason that no legislative or executive has even attempted it. During the 1960’s and 70’s, there was some
thought given to the notion of “preventive detention,” in which persons who were a threat to society could
be incarcerated, but this idea mostly died out under political pressure. The portion that remained is the
presence in a few states of civil commitment proceedings for violent sexual offenders. These persons are
thought to be in a special category because evidence shows that they tend not to “age out” of their
aggressive behavior.127 These statues are very little different from those that authorize civil commitment
for a person who is “a danger to himself or others.”
When the Kansas sexual offender statute was challenged, the Supreme Court stated, “We have
consistently upheld such involuntary commitment statutes provided the confinement takes place pursuant
to proper procedures and evidentiary standards.”128
Although freedom from physical restraint has “always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action,” that liberty interest is not absolute. The Court
has recognized that an individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint
may be overridden even in the civil context.129
Now that Britain and Israel have adopted emergency detention provisions, is the United States likely
to follow suit? Perhaps more incidents such as 9/11 could persuade the populace to go along with such a
severe imposition on basic liberties, but the courts are not likely to play along.
D. Problems With the Civilian Criminal System
Finally, what is wrong with use of the civilian court system for trial of those Guantanamo detainees
who are accused of being AlQaeda confederates? or of additional persons arrested and accused of being
part of a terrorist cell, such as the Lackawanna Six or the Portland Five? or Jose Padilla?
One problem with use of the criminal process for alleged terrorists is in defining a crime. Clandestine
use of arms may well constitute a crime under international law. There are ample crimes that can be
charged in the civilian system under the heading of universal jurisdiction. Crimes against air piracy,
hostage taking, destruction of life or property, are all criminalized by US statute as well as by
international conventions. The only thing lacking in international law is a proscription against terrorism
generally.
The US has attempted to fill the terrorism definitional void by defining the crime of providing
material support to a terrorist or a designated terrorist organization.130 These statutes are being employed
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against those who may be supportive of others who have committed or planned to commit violent acts. In
a sense, the statute defines a conspiracy without calling it a conspiracy. Even under the relaxed standards
of conspiracy law, the criminal defendant is not usually accountable absent knowledge of the general
nature of a crime that is to be committed. Generalized knowledge that a group is likely to carry out violent
action when the occasion arises is not enough for conviction of conspiracy to commit the crime.
Under the most relaxed view of due process, reflected in the anti-labor and anti-communist legislation
of the early 20th Century, the Supreme Court did uphold legislation that made it a crime merely to belong
to an organization with unlawful objectives.131 When the red baiting of the 1950’s subsided, the Court
then stated that these holdings had been thoroughly discredited and that constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such actions.132
If an individual were subjected to prosecution for belonging to a terrorist organization, US
constitutional guarantees would require proof that the individual knew of the imminence of violence. This
is the type of evidence that may be extremely difficult to marshal with regard to someone whose role in a
foreign organization took place clandestinely in various foreign arenas.
Perhaps the most salient argument against the civilian justice system is the military courts’ ability to
“provide for . . . the handling of, admission into evidence of, and access to materials and information in a
manner consistent with the protection of information classified or classifiable.” The civilian courts
There are two statutes, one for providing material support or resources knowing or intending that they be used in
violent acts, and the other for providing material support or resources to a designated organization.
USC 2339A. Providing material support to terrorists
(a) Offense. Whoever, within the United States, provides material support or resources or conceals or
disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or intending
that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of [specified federal crimes], or in
preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment or an escape from the commission of any such
violation, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than years, or both.
Definition. In this section, the term “material support or resources” means currency or other financial
securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation,
and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.
USC 2339B. Providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations
(a) Prohibited Activities.- Unlawful conduct. Whoever, within the United States or subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, or attempts or conspires to, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than years,
or both.
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this
section.
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similarly can hear claims of privilege that would prevent disclosure of classified information, but because
criminal proceedings must be open to the public, the civilian courts could not receive that evidence
without making it known to the public.
The administration does not want a public trial with disclosure of evidence because it does not want
public disclosure of the sources of its information.133 Moreover, in many instances that information might
be sufficient to justify a reasonable person’s acting on it but fall short of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.134 Again, it is worth pointing out what the criminal defendant would be entitled to receive: a
speedy and fair public trial, a terminable sentence commensurate with the evidence, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that this individual participated in conduct amounting to a crime under US law or
universal law.
The heart of the problem with open trials for alleged terrorists is that thwarting well-organized, welldisciplined, fanatical groups will require intelligence work premised on infiltration. This means placing
informants into, or buying the cooperation of informants within, the heart of the organizations. We will be
doing business with some very nasty people, and we will need to protect those people by not revealing the
nature of the information we have about those we capture. Revealing that information necessarily would
demonstrate the source of the information, thus jeopardizing the informants who provided it.135
These problems have been addressed by Congress at least twice in the past two decades, once in the
Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980136 and again in the 1996 statute criminalizing material
support for terrorist organizations.137 In essence, these statutes permit the trial judge in a criminal
prosecution to review government claims for secrecy of evidence in camera, to order use of redacted
disclosures or summaries, and to exclude classified information from introduction at trial.
The extent to which the classified information procedures can be applied consistently with the
defendant’s rights to confrontation and due process remains to be seen. Certainly, judges could be
presented with some excruciatingly difficult choices, in the extreme being faced with the prospect of
releasing a very nasty terrorist to prevent disclosure of information in a public trial. One consolation is
that the terrorist is not likely to have committed only one crime; there may be other offenses that can be
charged without the need for disclosure of classified information. Perhaps another consolation would be
133
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that the government is not about to let that person wander loose in public without constant surveillance.
This will be expensive, yes, but perhaps not that much more expensive than life-time confinement would
be anyway.
E. Judicial Review of Military Detentions
In two pending cases, Yaser Esam Hamdi and Jose Padilla are being held in the Navy brig at Norfolk,
Virginia. Hamdi is a US citizen who was captured in the military engagement (i.e. during wartime) in
Afghanistan. The Government has not chosen to disclose the circumstances of his capture, whether he
was actively engaged in carrying arms against US troops or what he was doing. Padilla, by contrast, was
arrested by civilian authorities when deplaning in Chicago after a trip to Pakistan, during which he
allegedly made plans to detonate a “dirty bomb” in the District of Columbia. In both cases, the Justice
Department is taking the position that the Government is not required to disclose to a court the basis for
the detention beyond the conclusion that each is an “enemy combatant.” The Government takes the
position that Hamdi can be held without benefit of counsel as part of its interrogation strategy. The
justification for this position is that the United States may capture and detain enemy combatants without
review by the courts.
Especially in a time of active conflict, a court considering a properly filed habeas action generally should
accept the military’s determination that a detainee is an enemy combatant.138
Even granting the wiggle room of the word “generally,” this is at best an astonishing statement. If
made by the government of any number of third-world countries over the last half century, it would bring
instant rebuke from both left and right political allegiances. The United States Government, apparently
recognizing the enormity of the statement, immediately asserts that its position “does not nullify the writ.”
The Government suggests two checks on the military. First, the court can insist on a statement of the
detainee’s status, and second the courts are assured of the efficacy of political checks on the executive
branch.
The first question presented by Hamdi is whether there is review authority to determine whether
indeed the detainee is an “enemy combatant.” The Hamdi brief attempts reassurance by stating that
although a court should accept the military’s determination that an individual is an enemy combatant, a
court may evaluate the legal consequences of that determination. For example, a court might evaluate
whether the military’s determination that an individual is an enemy combatant is sufficient as a matter
of law to justify his detention even if the combatant has a claim to American citizenship. In doing so,
however, a court may not second guess the military’s determination that the detainee is an enemy
combatant, and therefore no evidentiary proceedings concerning such determination are necessary.
But the Government also takes the position that the EC determination is “sufficient as a matter of law
to justify his detention.” If a court were to decide as the Government wished, then the EC determination
effectively isolates the detainee from any judicial oversight whatsoever. The Supreme Court never
hesitated in either Quirin or Eisentrager to assert its authority to make the basic determination of the
prisoner’s status. Anything less would undercut the entire structure which this nation’s jurisprudence is
built. If there were any need for specific authority for this proposition, we need look no further than the
essentials of due process in the fifth amendment, seizure and arrest requirements in the fourth
amendment, and place of trial requirements in the sixth amendment.
If, on the other hand, the court decided that a military determination were not sufficient as a matter of
law, then the Government would have to decide what its next step should be. We can speculate that it
would then turn either to proof of combatant status or to another course such as trial for specific criminal
conduct. Pursuing the first course requires asking what sort of evidence would be required for the United
States to justify its holding a citizen without trial. What might this be? Actually, with Hamdi all the
Government needs to show is that he was bearing arms against the US. For a person captured bearing
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arms in the “theater of operations,” a military commission should have ample jurisdiction.139
The second reassurance offered by the Government in Hamdi is the usual fallback for executive
discretion. Coupling two different statements from the Federalist Papers together, the Government asserts
that the courts have no role in “reviewing military decisions or operations.” The first statement from the
Federalist is said to be that, with regard to military affairs, “if the majority should be really disposed to
exceed the proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger [by the minority], and [the
community] will have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it.”140 Looking at this language
in context leads almost to the conclusion that the Government is playing cynical games. The passage is by
Hamilton and concerns assurances that Congress will have control of the military by virtue of its inability
“to vest permanent funds for the support of an army” and by action of the “party in opposition.” When the
entire objective of the executive is to hide information from the other branches and the public, as in
Hamdi, it is difficult to place much reliance on the power of the Loyal Opposition. The second quote,
regarding the judiciary’s lack of influence over either sword or purse, related to assurances that the
judiciary would not be able to rule by fiat.141
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Using these quotes to support plenary military authority is far from fair to the authors of the Federalist
Papers, who could hardly have been arguing in favor of rule by military fiat. They had just fought a war
against a runaway monarch, had drafted a Constitution full of checks on executive power, and were
consistently reminding the public of the need to be vigilant against the abuses of a standing army.
The Fourth Circuit’s response to these arguments142 was to straddle both sides of the fence, an
uncomfortable if not downright painful position. After reciting the reasons for judicial deference to
executive military decisions and praising American reliance on the Bill of Rights and habeas corpus, the
court held that Hamdi could be detained because in fact he had been captured bearing arms against the US
in an active combat zone. “We shall, in fact, go no further in this case than the specific context before us S
that of the undisputed detention of a citizen during a combat operation undertaken in a foreign country
and a determination by the executive that the citizen was allied with enemy forces.”
The Fourth Circuit seemed to hold that a court must accept the factual determinations of the military
without judicial review143 but it backed off the most extreme implications of this position by gratefully
144
accepting the Government’s “voluntary” submission of some factual information. A fair reading of the
Fourth Circuit’s opinion is that the judiciary must defer to the military and that the military must defer to
the judiciary, which shows the extraordinarily difficult position in which the court found itself.
Given that difficulty, isn’t this precisely the time to fall back on tradition and on tried-and-true
processes? Given the closeness of the question, the best answer should be to choose the route that is least
disruptive to the American system of law and to insist that Hamdi be remitted to the civilian justice
system unless the military is willing to place him on trial for crimes committed in a military theater of
operations. In neither military law nor civilian law is there any justification for indefinite detention of an
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American citizen once he is removed from the theater of operations.
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Id. at *: “The factual inquiry upon which Hamdi would lead us, if it did not entail disclosure of sensitive
intelligence, might require an excavation of facts buried under the rubble of war. The cost of such an inquiry in
terms of the efficiency and morale of American forces cannot be disregarded. Some of those with knowledge of
Hamdi's detention may have been slain or injured in battle. Others might have to be diverted from active and
ongoing military duties of their own. The logistical effort to acquire evidence from far away battle zones might be
substantial. And these efforts would profoundly unsettle the constitutional balance.”
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Id. at *: “This deferential posture, however, only comes into play after we ascertain that the challenged decision is
one legitimately made pursuant to the war powers. It does not preclude us from determining in the first instance
whether the factual assertions set forth by the government would, if accurate, provide a legally valid basis for
Hamdi's detention under that power. Otherwise, we would be deferring to a decision made without any inquiry into
whether such deference is due. For these reasons, it is appropriate, upon a citizen's presentation of a habeas petition
alleging that he is being unlawfully detained by his own government, to ask that the government provide the legal
authority upon which it relies for that detention and the basic facts relied upon to support a legitimate exercise of
that authority. Indeed, in this case, the government has voluntarily submitted -- and urged us to review -- an affidavit
from Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, describing what the
government contends were the circumstances leading to Hamdi's designation as an enemy combatant under Article
II's war power.”
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The case of Jose Padilla is even more doubtful. Padilla is a US citizen, arrested on US soil, carrying
no weapons (he just stepped off a secure airplane), but allegedly hoping to carry out an attack on US soil
at an undisclosed date in the future. The Government first held him as a “material witness” before a grand
jury in New York but then transferred him to military custody as an “enemy combatant.” A habeas corpus
petition in the Southern District of New York has been met with claims by the US that isolation of Padilla
is necessary “to bring psychological pressure to bear on him for interrogation” and that the court should
accept the factual conclusions of the Defense Intelligence Agency that Padilla was engaged on a mission
for a terrorist network. Whatever the facts that may be disclosed to the court in camera, it is difficult to
see how actions in a terrorist capacity make a US citizen subject to military power.
There is one glaring distinction between Padilla and the Quirin defendants. The Quirin group was
acting under the orders of an enemy nation-state during a declared war. By contrast, AlQaeda is not a
nation-state and there is no “law of war” for a military court to apply. There are basically three ways of
dealing with Padilla. First, he could be tried in civilian court for conspiracy to commit any number of
crimes by exploding a bomb. Second, he could be tried in military court for violation of the law of war. Is
there really any difference between trial in a civilian court and a military court? The US Court of Military
Appeals has applied the same standards of public trial requirements in dealing with classified materials as
would a civilian court. The problem is that without a nation-state sponsor or principal, there is no
provision of the law of war that Padilla has violated, and the military courts are not statutorily authorized
to try offenses that do not have a military connection.
Third, the Government argues that Padilla could be held in indefinite military detention without any
trial process at all. The minimum thrust of due process, from Magna Carta forward, has been to prevent
unreviewed executive incarceration. Even with the precedent of Quirin, it is not easy to construct a
justification for allowing the military to hold a US citizen arrested on US soil without trial. The
defendants in Quirin at least received a prompt (very prompt) military trial.
The District Court in Padilla has issued two opinions, the first very scholarly and deferential and the
second approaching testiness with the Government. Let’s look at what the Government argued and the
court’s responses. As in Hamdi, the Government argued that the President was entitled to classify Padilla
as an enemy combatant under the precedent of Quirin and that the determination was entitled to deference
from the courts. When pressed by the court as to why this should be the case, the Government proferred
basically two justifications for detention without trial, to “prevent him from rejoining the enemy,” and to
allow investigators to maintain “psychological pressure” to obtain information from him. Despite the
court’s impatience with the Government’s behavior in the case, it accepted both arguments as valid and
required only that “some evidence” be offered to show that he was “engaged in a mission against the
United States on behalf of an enemy with whom the United States is at war.”
With all due respect, neither of the proferred justifications is persuasive. And even under the court’s
standard, there is no possibility that AlQaeda can be considered “an enemy with whom the United States
is at war.”
The argument of preventing Padilla from rejoining the enemy calls for nothing more than a trial,
conviction, and sentence. He should no more be allowed to rejoin his AlQaeda buddies than should a drug
lord be allowed to rejoin his cohorts. What distinguishes Padilla from the common street criminal with
ties to a Colombian drug cartel? The wantonness of his desire to kill and maim? Is he more like a serial
killer or mass murder? Granted this consideration (assuming it exists) should affect the length of his
and morale of American forces cannot be disregarded. Some of those with knowledge of Hamdi's detention may
have been slain or injured in battle. Others might have to be diverted from active and ongoing military duties of their
own. The logistical effort to acquire evidence from far away battle zones might be substantial. And these efforts
would profoundly unsettle the constitutional balance.” Id. at *. But this argument is simply unpersuasive in light of
modern communications and transportation, especially a year after the military operation has reached 90% of its
objectives and now consists of something closer to occupation than active engagement.
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sentence, but the concept of preventive detention has been considered and rejected in any number of
settings. Incarceration follows proof, not mere suspicion or even unreviewed hearsay. The court
commented that prisoners of war could be detained “for the duration of the hostilities,” but there is not
likely to be a duration of hostilities with AlQaeda for the simple reason that there is no political structure
with which to negotiate terms and conditions of peace. The object of war is peace, AlQaeda has no
peaceful objectives, and the conflict with AlQaeda cannot plausibly be considered a war.
The psychological pressure argument flies in the face of due process and all its related themes. It is
difficult even to imagine cases dealing with this kind of argument. Do we look at cases granting immunity
as the Government argued? Nothing in those cases even hint at isolated confinement without judicial
process. Court orders for immunity or to compel testimony before a grand jury are court orders in which
the witness knows exactly what is demanded and knows the consequences of refusing to divulge. Shall
we look at the purposes behind Miranda? The strictures on custodial interrogation are irrelevant because
the custody can continue only until arraignment, and the testimony is sought for prosecution purposes.
Shall we look at the walls and barriers built to prevent prosecutorial use of surveillance information under
FISA? Again, there is no custody, no pressure, no psychological dependence. Frankly, the surprising part
of the Padilla district court opinion is that the judge did not declare this argument to be an outrageous
attack on the Constitution.
Finally, for the same reasons that there is not an enemy with whom to negotiate a cessation of
hostilities, there is no entity as to which to apply the court’s “some evidence” standard. Who is the
“enemy with whom the United States is at war?” Is AlQaeda different from ETA? from any number of
other para-military organizations that use violence against civilians either to make political points or to
carry out their own frustrations?
Accepting the Government’s position in Hamdi, that civilian courts may not inquire into the bases of
classifying a person as an enemy combatant, would constitute a radical change in the American way of
doing government business. That position in the context of Padilla, who was not captured within any
theater of operations, is quite simply unsupportable. “War is too important to be left to the Generals” is a
statement intended to express something about limits on the use of force. In this regard, however, it
expresses something about the very nature of our national psyche. In this situation, perhaps we should
also be cognizant that “this war is too important to be left to the politicians.” The judiciary is independent
from the executive for a very good reason. It is the people’s check on abuses of executive power.
IV. Status of the Guantanamo Detainees
As of November 2002, approximately 598 persons were being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba after
being captured in Afghanistan, and facilities were being constructed to hold as many as 2,000 prisoners.
The first releases from Guantanamo Bay occurred in October 2002 when three Afghanis were repatriated
to that country pursuant to a finding that they were connected to neither the Taliban regime nor
AlQaeda.146 A fourth person was released to an undisclosed country. Saudi Arabia and Britain have made
official requests for custody of their nationals.
Our last step in this exercise of exploring the intersection of the judiciary and the military in
responding to terrorism is to question the status of the Taliban detainees at Guantanamo Bay. The Taliban
detainees include nationals from a number of countries, such as Britain and Sweden, which have begun
demanding that their citizens either be repatriated or accused of a crime. It is possible that some of the
Guantanamo detainees could be charged with terrorist acts in league with organizations such as AlQaeda,
but Government press releases and court filings indicate only that they are being held for their
involvement as functionaries of the Taliban regime.147 As yet, the US courts have denied any role for
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judicial review over their status148 and the Government has shown no inclination to bring any of them
before either military or judicial tribunals.
The United States administration will not likely prosecute many of the Taliban in the US criminal
justice system, neither civilian nor military, for the simple reason that most of them cannot be accused of
crimes cognizable under US law. There are some, undoubtedly, who could be brought to task for “crimes
against humanity” on the basis of the human rights violations that occurred in Afghanistan while the
Taliban regime was in place. Torture, dismemberment, and execution may be crimes cognizable in
universal jurisdiction, but only if they were either part of an “armed conflict”149 or “committed as part of
150
a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population” and only if the individual had a
151
culpable level of knowledge or intent. Universal jurisdiction over acts of brutality generally does not
apply to the internal actions of a state against its own citizens until those acts rise to the level of
systematic torture.152 Although it might be worthwhile to prosecute some of the Taliban leadership for
their most egregious violations of human rights, there is no indication that the persons held by the US
military fall into the leadership category. Moreover, in its position opposing the International Criminal
Court, the United States has expressed grave concern about the concept of universal jurisdiction by which
persons could be tried outside their home countries for offenses committed against their own population.
A. POW Status and International Law
The United States issued an explicit policy statement that the persons detained at Guantanamo Bay
are not to be considered prisoners of war.153 The statement distinguished between Taliban detainees and
alQaeda detainees. With respect to the former, because the Taliban government was never recognized as
the legitimate government of Afghanistan, its troops would not be POW’s of a nation. With respect to the
AlQaeda members, the statement declares that they are members of a foreign terrorist group and not
entitled to POW status. The statement declared that although the detainees are not entitled to POW
due process rights under the GPW. Jordan Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH.
J. INT’L LAW 1, 5-8 n. 15 & 16 (2001).
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privileges, they will be provided many POW privileges as a matter of policy. The statement delineated
some aspects of humane treatment that would be available to the detainees and some that would not. In
general, they would be given food, clothing, and shelter, but would not be provided access to money or
purchasable goods.
The official policy statement is silent about many aspects of POW treatment detailed under the
Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War (GPW). First, however, we should be clear that if one is neither
arrested in the civilian system nor classified as a prisoner of war, that person still cannot be treated with
impunity and subjected to brutal treatment. The universal rules of law, as well as various treaties and
conventions, prevent murder, torture, starvation, or holding of hostages.154
With regard to conditions of confinement, under the GPW, POW’s are entitled to minimum standards
of food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment. Although the descriptions of these items in the GPW at
first glance might appear to describe a standard of living above the norm in many third world countries,
and above the poverty line in developed nations, the standards do not require caring for prisoners at a
level higher than is afforded to the soldiers or citizens of the detaining nation.155 It is at least arguable that
for a developed nation to provide grossly substandard conditions to POW’s would be a violation of the
proscriptions against starvation or inhumane treatment regardless of the language of the GPW.
Nevertheless, POW status under the GPW does guarantee these conditions as more than a mere policy.
POW status would also trigger the right of international NGO’s to inspect the premises and observe
the treatment of prisoners. The US policy on the detainees accords the International Committee of the Red
Cross this visitation and consultation privilege. POW’s are entitled to means and places of worship,
recreation, and education. They are allowed to correspond with friends and relatives. The US policy
contemplates allowing most of these opportunities with limitations because “many detainees at
Guantanamo pose a severe security risk to those responsible for guarding them and to each other.”
The policy statement is silent about the crucial issues of long term destiny of the detainees. POW’s
can be tried for offenses only as defined by the detaining power for its own soldiers, and under conditions
equivalent to those provided for the armed forces of the detaining power.156 In any such proceeding, they
are entitled at least to counsel, notice of charges, and the opportunity to present evidence.
For present purposes, probably the most significant distinctive feature of POW status is the right to
repatriation, either at the end of hostilities or when an individual is sufficiently sick or feeble as no longer
to be a threat to the detaining nation. This right alone reflects the difficulties in according POW status to a
suspected terrorist. Stated most simply, it is difficult to imagine a point of cessation of hostilities with
terrorism.
Generally speaking, a person serving in the armed forces of his country has a personal animosity
toward the armed forces of a hostile nation principally because it is in his interests to do so. If it is
necessary to think and react in “kill or be killed” terms, then the soldier needs the shield of personal
animosity. But when the hostilities cease, the personal animosity can cease because it had nothing to fuel
it other than the hostilities themselves. In other words, the soldier takes on the mission of his government.
Even when serving his family and people, he is responding to a more or less official call to arms. When
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the call is terminated, the likelihood of violence should diminish if not cease.157
By contrast, the terrorist is responding to deep-seated animosity independent of any official call to
arms. The call is from irregulars to begin with, and it is not made with a specific set of solutions in mind.
It may have quasi-political objectives but only the total collapse of the targeted regime will satisfy those
objectives, and often even that may not turn off the animosity.158 The personal animosity is the reason for
the hostilities, not the other way around. Therefore, an official cessation of hostilities does nothing to
assuage the personal animosity and the terrorist continues to be a threat into the foreseeable future.
It does not make sense to speak of prisoners of war in the absence of a war. And the war on terrorism
is not a “state of armed conflict” between nations. With neither an official sponsoring state nor an official
means of declaring a cessation of hostilities, the alleged terrorist is on his own and subject to normal
criminal processes..
But the Taliban detainees should be separated from the alQaeda members for this purpose. The
Taliban were combatants of an enemy government, whether considered a legitimate government or not.
The Taliban could be repatriated into the tender mercies of the new regime in Afghanistan without, for the
most part, presenting any greater likelihood of immediately joining a terrorist organization than would be
true for much of the Arab world’s population, many of whom carry intense hostility toward the EuroNorAm culture.159 In other words, absent some showing of individual circumstances, the Taliban
detainees are no more likely to be terrorists than any of millions of their cohort, and the problem of
continuing terrorist hostility is not particularly realistic.
All of this points in the direction that the Taliban might have claims to protection under various treaty
provisions, most notably the GPW. The problem with that approach is that treaty obligations generally
exist among nations and do not grant rights to individuals.
B. Enemy Aliens and Habeas Corpus
Several habeas corpus and related petitions were presented to federal courts in the District of
Columbia and consolidated under the heading of Khaled al Odah v. United States.160 All these petitions
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were brought on behalf of nationals of nations other than Afghanistan,161 and all essentially challenged
the authority of the United States to hold the detainees without due process. The DC Circuit held that
habeas corpus is not available to aliens held outside the “sovereign territory” of the United States for the
simple reason that those persons have no constitutional rights under US law.
There is very little reason to question this holding. It would hardly make sense to hold the United
States to the obligation to obey interpretations of the US Constitution in dealing with nationals of other
nations in various places around the globe. Holding the US to its obligations under international law, and
perhaps to the municipal law of whatever country it is involved in, is difficult enough without adding the
complication of requiring our operations to obey potentially conflicting obligations of domestic law. The
problem, again, is that the requirements of international law, treaties, and municipal law of other nations
must be enforced through diplomatic methods or perhaps through the courts of the other nation.
The important point in all this is that the Government’s insistence on an unreviewable discretion to
classify persons as “enemy aliens” was firmly rejected by the DC Circuit. These detainees were not
nationals of a country with which the United States is in enemy status. If an Australian chooses to commit
crimes against the US, that does not make Australia an enemy. In an offhand bit of dictum, however, the
court said that “[a]n ‘alien friend’ may become an ‘alien enemy’ by taking up arms against the United
States, but the cases before us were decided on the pleadings, each of which denied that the detainees had
engaged in hostilities against America.” This is an unfortunate and unnecessary statement that runs
counter to the court’s own argument that the US “response” to 9/11 is “against a network of terrorists
operating in secret throughout the world and often hiding among civilian populations.” This response has
nothing to do with “enemy” status, which is the language of war and applies to relationships among
nations. The person who engages in hostilities against a nation without any affiliation with another nation
should be considered a criminal, not an “enemy” within the language and laws of war.
Conclusion
We have looked at just a few of the many governmental actions in the “war” on terrorism. The few
that we have considered coalesce in the arena of defining terrorism offenses under the “law of nations” or
the “law of war.”
With regard to the Guantanamo detainees, a distinction can be drawn between those foreign nationals
who were serving in the “regular” forces of the Taliban regime who can be repatriated as soon as it is
determined that they have not individually committed a crime under either US or international law. With
regard to the alleged AlQaeda confederates, they could be transferred to the civilian criminal system with
attendant difficulties of the disclosure of classified intelligence information. Perhaps they could be
extradited to another country for trial, but that presents issues of whether the requesting country provides
adequate safeguards for rights of the defendant.
With regard to persons accused of committing terrorist acts against the US or its interests, whether
they are foreign nationals or US citizens should be irrelevant. Until the international community defines
terrorist crimes as being violations of the “law of war,” the US system should commit that these persons
be tried in civilian courts rather than by military commissions. The principal reason for this conclusion is
not that the civilian courts are necessarily “better” than military commissions but because there is no
coherent distinction between the alleged terrorist and the ordinary street criminal.
The law abhors incoherence. The lack of coherence in this setting results from making the defining
characteristic for recourse to a military commission to be violation of the “law of war,” and the
international community has not defined terrorist acts as violations of the law of war. One approach worth
exploring is that definition of international terrorism for this purpose should be limited to those who act
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“under color of state authorization” in a fashion similar to the US definition of civil rights violations
committed “under color of state law.”
If there is any general thought that comes to mind about terrorism and the processes of American law,
it is this. Terrorism is not subject to a war to be won with brute force, it is a battle for the hearts and
minds of a very large disaffected portion of the world population. To win that battle, we must be better
than we want to be. One beginning point is building coherence into our legal responses, and the history of
our own country should be useful.
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